The second author thanks the YrjÄ o Jahnsson Foundation for ¯nancial support. We also wish to thank Todd Gunther, Jinyong Han, Steve Morris, Andrew Postlewaite and Juuso VÄ alimÄ aki for helpful comments and advice. Top Hotels Close to Tor House Carmel Mission Inn 3665 Rio Rd, Carmel, CA, 93923 189 per night Sep 27 - Sep 28 Stay at this 3.5-star hotel in Carmel. You can also catch a bus from downtown Monterey to central Carmel. Special thanks are also due to Aki Matsui for his advice and encouragement since the very beginning of this project. Tor House is located on Carmel Point, south of central Carmel-by-the-Sea, which is a 15-minute drive from Monterey. We are most grateful to our adviser George Mailath for his invaluable advice and encouragement. For this case, we characterize conditions for a sequential equilibrium in which both high and low quality are supplied.
when networking is costly and M is large, low quality is supplied with positive probability in any Nash equilib-rium. We also show that high quality can be sold in a sequential equilibrium with population M even when each buyer periodically interacts with only N ¤ (M) players where 0 < lim M !1 N ¤2 =M < 1: We show that. We study community enforcement in a private information, random match-ing setting, where buyers privately \network" for information and sellers have a short term incentive to supply low quality.
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